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Candidly speaking, the Legal Theory and Practice (LTP) courses'
essential purpose is to inculcate values leading our graduates to represent
poor and underrepresented people and communities.1 Thus, the LTP
program was born under the cloak of a particular concept of "profes-
sional responsibility." While the profession has a long tradition of so
exhorting its members, it must be admitted that it has little to show for
it.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A. 1975, Uni-
versity of South Carolina; J.D. 1978, Columbia University; LL.M. 1986, Georgetown Univer-
sity. I am indebted to Richard Boldt, Theresa Glennon, and Jane Singer for engaging with me
about the ideas presented here, for encouraging me to commit them to paper, and for giving
me their thoughtful responses to earlier drafts. I also thank Marc Feldman, Everett Goldberg,
Alan Hornstein, Homer La Rue, and Michael Millemann for their insightful comments.
1. This was a charge directed to the Law School by the Advisory Council of the Mary-
land Legal Services Corporation (also known as the Cardin Commission, for its Chair, Con-
gressman Benjamin Cardin). See Introduction to Students and Lawyers, Doctrine and
Responsibility: A Pedagogical Colloquy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1107, 1107-08 n.1 (1992); see also
MARYLAND LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO
MARYLAND'S POOR 35 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN] (reporting that four out of five
poor persons in Maryland lacked necessary civil legal assistance and recommending, among
several dozen proposals, that the State's two law schools develop educational approaches that
instill in law students, as a professional value, each lawyer's responsibility to serve the poor
and underrepresented of the State).
2. The Cardin Commission's charge followed in the rhetorical footsteps of many of the
legal profession's most prominent reformers on behalf of justice for the poor. One of the most
famous criticisms of the misallocation of lawyers among rich and poor was that of Louis Bran-
deis, who urged American lawyers that: "We hear much of the 'corporation lawyer' and far
too little of 'the peoples' lawyer,'" and that "the great opportunity in the law" is "to protect
also the interests of the people." Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in BusI-
NESs-A PROFESSION 329, 337 (1933). A vigorous and sincere progressive tradition can be
traced within the bar. See, ag., David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of
Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717 (1988); William Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985); cf JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUS-
TICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) (elitism and pervasive
exclusion based on sex, race, ethnicity, class, and religion are arguably the more widespread
incidents of the profession's traditions).
[1159]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
From my perspective, the project in which my colleagues and I en-
gage is this: To create in the law school a crucible in which students'
overly ordered notions of resort to the law might mingle with their poor
clients' circumstances, so that an impulse, conviction, conversion, deci-
sion, or mere openness might ignite, with the result that our graduates
would see ways to include the legal needs of poor people in their future
practices. At the heart of the reconceived courses we call Legal Theory
and Practice, lies the expectation that each lawyer can, and does, bear
responsibilities to poor people. A central LTP teaching task is to enable
each student to wrestle with the parameters of this responsibility, person-
ally, in the formative stages of legal education.
Learning responsibility suffers from the same phenomena of law
school socialization described herein by Theresa Glennon, and it requires
a corresponding counter-socialization. 3 Law schooling exaggerates the
importance of external rules, of claims or defenses, and of analytic rea-
soning. It treats these as the subjects of thought processes that can and
ought to be conducted in relative insularity from other thought
processes. In so doing, traditional legal education signals the irrelevance
of social context, moral reasoning, care and connection among people
(clients, lawyers, law students), and inward inquiry for intuitions about
justice or for motivations of response to others in need, instructing stu-
dents to lay these concerns aside.
The means of counter-socialization that I discuss here involve the
direct provocation of another to ask: What is my own responsibility as a
lawyer to people who are poor? LTP courses seek to insist that students
ask themselves this question, beyond the points of comfortable unself-
consciousness. The courses require students to value values, and engage
in valuing, not only as a matter of doctrinal deconstruction, but also in
the introspection that attends the moral choices we each necessarily
make in work that affects others. This is deeply challenging in two im-
portant respects. First, the question is experienced as "personal," that
is, as directed to one's most private person, not merely to socially defined
and publicly performed roles like "student" or "lawyer."'4 Furthermore,
3. See Gerald P. L6pez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and So-
cially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 347-55 (1989);
Toni Pickard, Experience as Teacher: Discovering the Politics of Law Teaching, 33 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 279 (1983) (control-abuse-alienation cycle of the classroom reflects the similar
process in the world outside; internalization of the existing social structures and hierarchy,
occurring outside of awareness, is accepted as inevitable).
4. Roles of this kind can be constraining and, as Boldt and Feldman suggest, pose a real
risk of reinforcing alienation through the adoption of another layer of role-based, limiting
behavior. Richard Boldt & Marc Feldman, The Faces of Law in Theory and Practice: Doc-
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the question presupposes a link between others' poverty and oneself that
is likely to conflict with most students' social experience and law school
instruction. Asked, as it is, in the context of legal work in communities
of poor people, it brings to the foreground a social system whose distribu-
tion of goods and resources is highly dependent on legal relations, and it
draws attention to the law-trained cadre available for hire to make that
system function.5
In this piece I attempt to articulate an enhanced concept of responsi-
bility, and a method for pursuing this counter-socialization in the moral
domain of law and lawyers' work. I begin by discussing the dominant
notions of lawyers' responsibilities, which are inhospitable to the devel-
opment by law students of a view of law practice that encompasses ser-
vice to poor communities. I then describe an approach for equipping
students to consider their own career-long responsibilities to those disad-
vantaged in the legal system by their poverty. This approach is based on
an investigation and "reconstructed knowing" of the real world opera-
tions of law and poverty, and a climate of personally challenging moral
conversation. I conclude that it is possible for teachers and students to
examine together the responsibilities the epidemic of deepening poverty
imposes on the plans each of us makes for law practice. For faculty
members (from whose perspective this is written), this requires great
clarity in our own minds and hearts, and thus in our work with students.
I. "Responsibility" for Lawyers: Moral Mush in Law School
A principal lesson of the traditional first year curriculum is that law-
yers' responsibility is limited. Even with today's expanded use of
problems and role-plays in classroom courses, the standard conception of
trine, Rhetoria and Social Context, 43 HASTINGS L.L 1111, 1113 (1992). Yet there are ways
that such roles can be enabling as well. For some, roles provide an opportunity to break
through some of the alienation produced by law school culture, or by social institutions in
which law school is embedded. On the liberating potential of lawyer roles for members of
socially or politically subordinated groups, see Homer La Rue, Developing an Identity of Re-
sponsible Lawyering Through Experiential Learning, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 1147 (1992); see also
Regina Austin, Sapphire Boundl, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539 (propounding this view as to the roles
of minority feminist legal scholars).
5. In relative terms, the most powerful wings of the profession, and most of the re-
sources spent on legal work, are captured by the big institutional players that shape the nation.
In addition, the legal profession has historically supplied a significant proportion of top man-
agement for big corporations. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. REv. 1, 31 n.88 (1988) and source cited therein.
For the view that gentlemen-lawyers in New York City are responsible for, and profit
from, the unmerited privilege, the discrimination, the oppression of the poor, that is around
them, see Peter M. Brown et al., Professional Responsibility: Has the Rise of the Megafirms
Endangered Professionalism?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 38.
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lawyers' functions and social roles sells to each class of incoming lawyers
an excused status. If harms were inflicted, disputing parties are responsi-
ble; if decisions have objectionable results or effects, they were made by
judges; robbers are entitled to counsel at public expense, so surely robber
barons are if they can pay the freight. Lawyers merely facilitate transac-
tions, solve problems, make the legal system go. Lawyers' work is to
provide the technical know-how by which clients pursue each other, and
lawyers are explicitly absolved from the taint of their clients' evil ends so
long as the means are "clean."' 6
Law schools' explicit instruction about responsibility delivers a simi-
larly limiting message. Three overt curricular expressions coexist. The
most common, and most vigorously criticized, is the application of legal-
ism to "responsibility." '7 The teaching of what purport to be ethical rules
for the legal profession lapses into an imitation of the legalistic methodol-
ogy of the bulk of the curriculum. It is deadening, taught as ahistorical,
apolitical, and removed from social contexts. It teaches students to re-
gard legal relationships as separate from the world in which they exist,
having no history and no ramifications for others or for social institu-
tions. The effect, and it is fair to say the effort, is to separate the lawyer
and her own ethical sensibilities from the broader social world in which
she will function.8
A second approach is professionalism. It proceeds from a broader
notion of lawyers' role, making reference to sociohistorical context, and
extolling the positive role of lawyers in shaping society. From this van-
tage point, it makes a call on lawyers to act in the public interest and
enact American liberal-democratic political ideals of inclusion.9 Some
6. See, ag., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(b) (1989) (a lawyer's
representation "does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities").
7. This turn has been criticized by many thoughtful observers of legal education. See,
eg., Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Re-
sponsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1175-76 nn.3-4 (1992).
8. This facilitates the process described by Theresa Glennon, in which students come
reinforced in the notion that morality is a merely private matter. Id. at 1176-77.
9. For the narrow purpose of delimiting this category, let me note that this rubric
catches what is otherwise a wide and divergent range of voices on the content of "professional-
ism." Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983) and ABA
COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR
THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) (illustrating the ceremonial rhetoric
of the American Bar Association) with DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988) (adher-
ents of "purposive lawyering"); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 36-47 (1986) (a revivalist of the 19th century notion of "civic virtue")
and William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 61-91.
[Vol. 4
April 1992] RECONSTRUCTING A PEDAGOGY OF RESPONSIBILITY 1163
purveyors of professionalism have the aggravating tendency to speak in
noble abstractions. They speak of the responsibility of "the legal profes-
sion" to represent "the poor," a plea that is made personal for most of
the bar only when the prospect of mandatory pro bono looms.10 One
further note in the chorus urging a return to halcyon days of a public-
regarding legal profession, is the concern that the practice of law has
become overly commercialized, a business rather than a "profession."1"
A third avenue for addressing lawyers' responsibility that has ven-
tured into law schools is a kind of pragmatics. Its focus is to render
ethical dilemmas of law practice more relevant, interesting, or compel-
ling by grounding them in actual practice. It may take the form of class-
room-based problems, or, as in recent years, it may serve as an argument
for the recognition of clinical courses in the core curriculum. 12 While
incarnations of this spirit may be concretely helpful to some poor people
in that some real legal services may be offered through law school clinics
or required pro bono programs, the larger effect of the approach is to
10. For a review of the unsatisfactory performance of most voluntary pro bono efforts,
see Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78, 88-92 (1990). Many mandatory pro bono requirements are
motivated primarily by the sense that the critical shortage of legal services to indigents denies
them "equal access to the justice system." See, eg., id at 83; ACTION PLAN, supra note 1.
Increased numbers of Americans living at or below the poverty line, compounded by society's
greater legal complexity and the decline of federal funding for civil legal services, compel a
sense of urgency and renewed commitment for some elements of organized bars. See, eg., id
at 1-2, 4, 17.
Without detracting from the intention and effect of the efforts of many pro bono attor-
neys, one may observe that the conception of pro bono as the bar's response to this emergency
is a limited, and limiting, one. In important part, it assumes: (1) that effective attention to the
sharp encounters of the poor with legal matters is to be accomplished through representation
of individual claims-and thereby detracts from the perception and redress of legal operations
that unduly burden people who are poor; and (2) that these claims are pressed through the
episodic charity of lawyers. A full critique is beyond the scope of this piece.
11. The concern serves as an added rationale for mandatory pro bono proposals. See,
e.g., ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 9; Barlow F. Christiensen, The Lawyer's
Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1 (arguing from the profession's
tradition of service and from lawyers' monopolistic role in the justice system); David L. Sha-
piro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735 (1980) (arguing for a
hortatory "duty" proceeding from traditional ethical aspirations, rather than prescription);
David Luban, Mandatory Pro Bono: A Workable (and Moral) Plan, 64 MICH. B.J., Mar. 1985,
at 280-83 (emphasizing that lawyers contribute directly to the problem of unmet legal need
through the self-selected allocation of their privileged status to affluent clients in an adversarial
system).
12. Indeed, this was one of the selling points made by the special faculty committee chair-
man appointed to review the initial development of the LTP courses. ("We have been looking
for ways to enhance the teaching of professional responsibility, and [here is a proven
method].")
contribute to the marginalization of poor people in the curriculum.
13 Ex-
horting students to the pragmatic quick-fix approach to isolated legal
problems of poor people does not promote, and actually discourages,
lawyers' attention to the systemic hostility of law's operation to poor
people.
None of these three visions of professional responsibility renders a
picture of the world, or of lawyers' work in it, that reaches the nub of
"responsibility" to which the LTP courses are directed. 14  What each
lacks is concern with the deepest question lawyers' work poses: Who
should I be?, or who should I become? 15 This is, of course, a lifelong
inquiry. In LTP courses, which occur early, but briefly in our students'
legal careers, the question takes a more specific form: Who am I in rela-
tion to poor people?
II. Responsibility in Legal Theory and Practice
All LTP courses require that students bear responsibility for some
legal work involving them in the lives of clients in some productive sense.
In my view, this offers a window with three frames that open for stu-
dents both outwardly-onto the gritty material and socially constituted
world-and inwardly-onto that stream of beliefs, values, and meanings
swirling in each of us. First, LTP courses insist that students look full
face on the operational meanings of law for poor people, clients and those
similarly situated to our clients-the silent others who are not now and
are not likely to be assisted by a lawyer to privately seek redress. This
frame represents the obligation to investigate the effects of the legal sys-
tem upon the poor as well as the nonpoor.
13. See Boldt & Feldman, supra note 4, at 1130.
14. Legalistic rules of the profession fail to provide an answer, and when they fail, the
student learns experientially the weight and waffle in rule-following. Reference to systemic
role notions eventually fail to rationalize and reconcile contradictory currents of knowledge
about the manipulation and enforceability of law, and collapses into cynicism, relativism, or
"mere politics." Pragmatism requires a response to the "problem" now, and slowly snares one
into a view of lawyers' work as solving problem after problem, without the capacity or need to
ask more deeply about their sources.
15. Gerald Frug's observation expresses my own view: "Answers to these [fundamental]
questions may be tentative and contestable, but no one, in my view, actually experiences the
task of answering them as meaningless or arbitrary." Gerald Frug, Argument as Character, 40
STAN. L. REV. 869, 876 (1988) (citations omitted). I am grateful to Howard Lesnick for this
reference.
For an application of a similar conception to lawyers' professional identity, see Thomas L.
Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lientenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a
Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 409 (1990/91).
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Second, students are expected to contemplate seriously what respon-
sibilities follow for themselves, in light of their knowledge of the opera-
tions of the law and their privileged place as lawyers therein. This frame
represents the obligation to ask and answer: What actions ought I to
take on behalf of poor and powerless people?
Third, this knowledge is utilized to reexamine theory, to search out
the values implied and expressed in the customary categories and expla-
nations of the law implicated by the needs and consequences identified.
This frame represents the obligation to forge alternative responses.
These frames, together, form the nub of an enhanced pedagogy of
responsible law practice. I focus here on the first and second frames, and
I refer readers to the essay by my colleagues Richard Boldt and Marc
Feldman for one operational account of the third frame. My experience
teaches me that all three must proceed together in forming an actualized
ethic for our students to employ themselves and their practices on behalf
of poor people. Neither the knowledge of cruel or unfortunate systemic
effects on people, nor the invention of responses to poor people's legally
described needs, move into the world of action without the predicate de-
cision: I will.
A. Responsibility and the Investigation of Law's Links to Poverty
The will to view one's responsibility as linked to others' impoverish-
ment and disadvantaged status, has scant observable support among law-
yers. Certainly as evidenced in the standard law school curriculum, the
legal profession is not particularly curious or concerned about the mate-
rial conditions or life chances confronting poor people. Nor is it anxious
to see its own complicity in powering the engines of the law that do the
business of lawyers' paying clients.
16
16. The fusion of legalism and professionalism that predominates legal education features
duties to fulfill obligations created by some aspect attributed to the individual professional-
e.g., by her undertaking a lawyer-client relationship, or perhaps by her obtaining a special
license in society vis-a-vis the justice apparatus. This conception of responsibility assumes a
society of separate selves, and creates a picture of moral decisionmaking as a framework by
which an individual can know at discrete moments how to make rational decisions.
In contrast, the relational conception of responsibility discussed in the following piece by
Theresa Glennon, assumes connectedness among people: a type of consciousness, awareness,
or sensitivity that we can affect another person's life, and that each of us carries the responsibil-
ity not to harm others. This notion is not bounded by moments of decision in the way the first
is; it is rooted in the need to take cognizance of social connections, perceiving people in their
own terms. See Nona Plesser Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships and Morality, in
MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 21, 22-23 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
Prevalent cultural assumptions encourage us to see ourselves as
helpless in the face of accelerating poverty. 17 From this acculturated
vantage, we see most immediately the overwhelming odds stacking the
deck against legal action, and legal theorizing, on behalf of the poor.
This perception is so full in our faces that, unattended, it crowds out
recognition of human suffering, of visceral injustice, as well as the im-
pulse for change.' 8
I believe a central task of LTP courses is to equip students to recog-
nize and break down the rhetoric of poverty, which operates as a key
element in the distancing between student and client of which my col-
leagues speak. To do this, it is necessary to break through students' dis-
connection from the context of their clients' lives, to create a connected
way of knowing something of the crush of poverty and its entanglements
with the law. 19 This entails forging a "reconstructed knowing" 20 of the
social world, and of its primacy in comprehending law, which otherwise
tends to be obscured by the dissection of law into insular subjects, and
the separation of theory from practice.
One effort to do so is illustrated by the LTP/Property course. 2' The
unifying work of the course was to identify the problems experienced by
poor tenants in obtaining fair results in one particular legal institution,
17. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79
GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
18. For legal professionals, this attitudinal training is crippling in two ways. First, one is
helpless as an individual, in the sense that poverty is huge, complex, and intractable, so that
surely our actions make no dent. Second, our socially constituted roles as lawyers do not equip
us to respond (i.e., we are without the power or authority to deal with the issues). Id. at 1509.
Authority, in the standard conception of lawyers' roles, is vested in agent-lawyers by cli-
ents or, in occasional circumstances, by virtue of the tradition that a lawyer is an officer of the
court. Both notions omit virtually all poor persons, who are clients relatively infrequently.
BARBARA CURRAN, AMERICAN BAR FOUND., REPORT ON THE 1989 SURVEY OF THE PUB-
LIC'S USE OF LEGAL SERVICES (1989). To different degrees, both notions affirm that there is
no "bystander liability" for the one class of persons specially educated to make the justice
system go.
19. As Theresa Glennon notes, not all of our students are as removed from this reality as
the text suggests. For some, such knowledge is first-hand; for others, it is gained through work
or life experiences. But the possession of such knowledge does not mean that it is readily
drawn upon, or spoken of, in class discussion. It is much harder to say whether such experi-
ence figures in these students' developing basic frameworks. Glennon, supra note 7, at 1184.
20. This phrase was suggested by Kathleen Ann Sullivan, citing MARY FIELD BELENKY
ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING 131-52 (1986), to express the process in which one
relates information learned, tests information against experience, and translates this interior
learning for use in external settings where it can be compared against external normative un-
derstandings. See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy
in the Clinical Relationship (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21. The course, taught to 24 first year students, was a joint venture with colleagues Rich-
ard Boldt and Everett Goldberg. It spanned January through May of 1990.
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Baltimore's Rent Court, and to propose means to redress them. The
course began with a substantial effort to redefine the subjects and meth-
ods for classroom learning. The legal rules governing landlords and ten-
ants, and a basic sense of their operation, were presented through a series
of counseling exercises conducted and analyzed in class. Students spent
considerable time and energy each week applying this knowledge to legal
work on behalf of indigent tenants. In the early weeks of the course,
students participated in the representation of tenants in warranty of hab-
itability cases in the court. On one level, this served as intensive training
as to the local rules, practices, and players. Beyond this, students' work
took them to clients' homes and streets, where in the course of interview-
ing and investigating, they heard from clients, met their clients' kids, felt
the winter cold and damp of ramshackle rowhouses, saw what passed for
dinner, and for Christmas. Being specially invited, as law students, into
households in which there is no phone, no steady job, beds in the "dining
room," and barely enough money for the rent, provided an essential basis
for the responsibility conversation described below.
Thereafter, students conducted a highly structured court observa-
tion study, conducted detailed exit interviews with over one hundred ten-
ants concerning their experiences with the court, and provided pro se
counseling to countless tenants in the court house. The choice of legal
work with a systemic focus was an intentional effort to better equip stu-
dents to see beyond experience with individual clients, which is often
positive and empathic, 22 to reach the negative stereotypes about "the
poor" that are promoted by contemporary poverty rhetoric. Small group
discussion sessions, which provided the forum for uncovering the value
premises of both the legal materials studied and of the law-practice data
generated by the students' work in the court, were the front line for stu-
dent attention to the attitudes and values piqued through meeting tenants
and learning about the contours of tenants' lives through the more for-
mal information-gathering of the court-watching and exit interview
projects.
23
22. And thus relegated by many students to the margins of their understanding of law
and of poor people (e.g., "My client is atypically likeable, hardworking, and deserving."). See
Boldt & Feldman, supra note 4, at 1118-19.
23. To provide structure for students' field observations, course materials included mul-
tidisciplinary readings concerning low-income housing, poverty, and the differential operation
of law and legal institutions for poor people. "Poverty" was examined as a matter of legal
definition for purposes of benefits programs; as variously framed by sociologists in scales of
income and structures of opportunity, education, and other statuses; and as experienced by
people unemployed, employed at wages below the poverty line, "disemployed" by plant clo-
sures, or foreclosed from employment by any combination of the many circumstances that
burdened as much as 15% of the population during the economic "recovery" in the mid-1980s.
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Field investigation of this kind presents the vehicle through which
students' knowledge of "law" is reconstructed. They begin to under-
stand law as an operation, a network of relationships, dependent upon an
array of complicated social facts scarcely conjured by words like "pov-
erty," "welfare," "tenant," or "unemployed." Social facts and relation-
ships are not accounted for by neatly categorized principles of law. New
knowledge is created, in part just by virtue of having to act in the
world,24 and in part by the intellectual effort to meld these interpersonal
and hands-on learning encounters with study materials (readings that of-
fer factual depictions of poverty; sociological data on links between pov-
erty, race, employment, and wage structures; and comparable material
particular to the practice setting in which the students engage). 25 The
method yields a qualitatively different way of knowing. The ways in
which legal concepts are understood after they have been used in the
scrutiny of a legal institution and in counseling pro se tenants therein, are
not the ways they were understood from diligent bookish study.
While the reconstructed knowing that may be accomplished
through investigation of the law's effects on poor people is a necessary
predicate, it is not an adequate substitute for students' wrestling with the
direct question of one's own responsibility to the poor and unrepre-
sented.26 Here is where the conversation can get dicey.
Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11 (1987).
24. This role performance triggers perception, feeling, intuition, and cognition, which
combine in new ways, producing knowledge at different levels of awareness, complexity, par-
ticularity, and immediacy. See Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary
Reflections on Clinical Education as a Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW
STUDENT 374, 382 (Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, Inc. ed.,
1973).
25. See supra note 23.
26. Here I do not mean to resolve the ongoing debate about the degree to which legal
education shapes student values, perceptions, and careers. While many critics assume that this
is so, for example Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982), reprinted from THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 1982),
and ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST
COMMITMENT DURING LAw SCHOOL (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989), much of the empirical
research on law student attitudes treats market forces as a stronger influence than experience
in professional school. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Barry & Patricia A. Connelly, Research on Law
Students: An Annotated Bibliography, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 751; E. Gordon Gee &
Donald W. Jackson, Current Studies of Legal Education: Findings and Recommendations, 32
J. LEGAL EDUC. 471 (1982); Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the
Formation of Law Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral
Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC.
306, 342-43, 358 (1981). Regardless of whether law schooling generally produces value
changes of the kind and extent claimed, my remarks presume that conscious inquiry into the
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B. Responsibility and Poverty in Moral Conversation
The premise undergirding the Cardin Report directive 27 is that each
lawyer is implicated in the structures of law and their consequences,
which privilege certain interests at the dullingly regular expense of im-
poverished others. This premise of responsible connectedness is a moral
position, a core question-and-answer for living one's life. By lodging the
question perpetually in the life of each "responsible" lawyer, it responds
to the question posed earlier: Who am I in relation to poor people?
The perception of obligated and responsive connectedness is not a
,stance that has immediate widespread appeal. It is discouraged by the
individualist tradition dominant in legal culture and in the larger culture
as well. 28 Furthermore, we all have much more experience of ourselves
as innocent, than we have impulses to see ourselves so connected as to be
implicated in others' oppression and vulnerability. It is others who jail
people, evict people, set the benefits levels, and create the cultural disdain
for "the undeserving poor."' 29 Isn't it? Unlike most of law schooling,
LTP courses invite students to reexamine this comforting conclusion.
Students' reported experiences in Socratic classrooms suggest that
one of the first lessons learned in law school is to witness others made to
suffer and be forced to stand silent in the face of that suffering.30 The
instruction to hold one's tongue in the law school classroom "prepares
one to [tolerate] the suffering that one sees out in the world. 31 If law
school delivers the lesson that compassion must give way to process, little
meanings and effects of one's actions nourishes the link between cognitive and moral develop-
ment, and that it is important and positive for this to be made a feature of legal education,
given the paucity in law schools of any emphasis on ideas like personal values or commitments.
For a thoughtful review connecting the works of developmental education theorists William
Perry, Karen Kitchener, and Patricia King to the branches of moral development theory asso-
ciated with Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, and Norma Haan, respectively, see Paul T.
Wangerin, Objective, Multiplisti4 and Relative Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal
Education, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1237 (1988).
27. See supra note 1.
28. See Glennon, supra note 7, at 1175-76. Howard Lesnick offers the view that the
notion that "private" choices are inappropriate for conversation outside familial circles is
rooted in the human practice throughout history of punishing people for holding perspectives
that are unpopular or diverge from dominant ones. Howard Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal
Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991 DUKE L.J. 413, 445.
29. For a history of this notion in the social policies of the United States, see Joel F.
Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle" The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legaliza-
tion, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899, 906 (1990); see also
Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991).
30. James R. Elkins, Pedagogy of Ethics, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 37, 58 (1985).
31. Id.
wonder that many students acknowledge so little about the functions and
effects of legal arrangements in the society.
The classroom example illustrates a fundamental aspect of social
conditioning about responses to wrongs. It presents the sort of moment
when, squirming under the discomforting weight of whether to object or
accede to an exercise of disproportionate power, one perceives the indi-
vidual who is suffering, or the social system that enables the harm. Some
may respond through empathy with identifiable other persons-the vic-
tim or victor. Others may, instead, perceive the net of socially allocated
resources-such as power, authority, self-possession, and confidence in
the classroom example-in which the suffering one is now ensnared.
Law students' work with poor clients offers parallel problems of
perceptual focus. Numerous clinical students in any given year develop
empathic, caring, identifying relationships with their clients,32 across cul-
turally significant boundaries of race, class, gender, and related life cir-
cumstances. However, too seldom does this privatized relational
experience work its way into students' awareness of the ideological and
sociocultural constructs of the legal world in which they move.3
3
Venturing into a poor people's law practice in Baltimore makes
vivid for LTP students that ours is a world marked by wide disparities in
the distribution of money, of political power, and of personal opportunity
for making significant life choices. Many LTP students observe first-
hand that the social system that accomplishes these distributive out-
comes is supported by legal rules and institutions that take little or no
account of their clients' justifiable claims. This discovery opens students
to consider the challenges thus posed to social and legal arrangements
they now see as problematic.
The LTP/Property students discovered in Rent Court, not the neu-
tral body adjudicating conflicting factual or legal claims rendered by
32. Perhaps these are more precisely described as student feelings for their clients, rather
than as reciprocal relationships.
33. Here lies the most troubling counterweight to the long-standing argument that expe-
riential education is important because bearing responsibility for client work is an inherently
synthesizing and motivating methodology that breathes real life into the bread-and-butter ethi-
cal dimensions of lawyers' work. While this is potentially true, it is an insufficient predicate for
the LTP courses. Clinical legal education, without more, focuses in a self-absorbed way on
lawyer performance and on assessment of clients' problems and case outcomes as defined by
the laws, procedures, methods, and culture owned particularly by the legal profession and the
interests it serves. In this respect, it may be more like than unlike much education that occurs
after graduates join law firms.
For a helpful review of research on the relation of legal education to personal and profes-
sional values, which notes the paucity of information on the effects of law school clinical expe-
rience in socializing students for professional responsibility, see Hellman, supra note 26.
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their other first-year courses, but instead a forum operated for the speedy
and convenient collection of rent by landlords, at taxpayers' expense. To
the surprise of several students, few tenants they met were scofflaws.
Many struggled each month to pay some sixty percent of their meager
household incomes to rent hovels, and the effort to scrape it together
each month left little time, energy, or expectation that telling the judge
about the trouble with the heat and the leaky pipes was likely to make
much difference.
34
Students' reactions to the poverty, the people, and the legal re-
sponses they encountered, created numerous openings for conversation
between teacher and student about the possible meanings for their re-
sponsibilities as lawyers. Most students departed the course with a
sharper awareness that to be poor in Rent Court meant as little, and as
much, as the utter inability to raise another fifty dollars from family or
friends.35 This led to some introspection far removed from the ordinary
discourse of the classroom. Some students shared moments of surprising
candor. "I never would have believed one could work so hard, and still
make so little." "He needed that sum to avoid an eviction; I spent that
much on the weekend, and I can't even think what it was for." "It oc-
curred to me to wonder, can I stand outside the courtroom and talk with
one more tenant, wearing a ninety-eight dollar 'barn jacket'?"
The day that tenants waited in line for advice from the white law
students, believing the black law students must be tenants too, provoked
pained and halting efforts later to express aloud the differing perceptions
within the group about the links between race and the maldistribution of
resources about which we shared some data: access to habitable housing,
to lawyers, to law school. Others wrestled with the ways they saw them-
selves as like, and not like, the tenants with whom they worked. 36 Each
34. A full account of the students' investigation of the court and the differential burdens
it places on tenants to vindicate their claims of rent-impairing conditions, as compared to the
smooth facilitation provided landlords, is recounted and analyzed in Barbara Bezdek, Silence
in the Court Subordination and Participation of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFsTRA L. Rnv. (forthcoming 1992).
35. Along the way, discussion in my LTP courses has included the existence and power
of poverty myths, including those declaiming who is poor and why; the adequacy of welfare
grants; the supposed ease of life without work, and the purported safety in the social security
net.
36. One student described the bond she felt on a deep level with her client, who, while the
same age as the student, lived a life the student thought was "almost impossible for me to
imagine." The student came from a family of lawyers. Her client was the mother of and
primary provider for six, who had lived her entire life "as a poor woman" in the hardscrabble
neighborhoods of South Baltimore. The student sought to make a personal connection be-
tween them through their lawyer-client relationship, "hoping, perhaps, to better understand
both of us."
of these is, I contend, a form of inquiry into the moral dimensions of
one's lawyering.
Conclusion
Up to this point, my effort has been to describe a method by which
students are launched into searching investigation and scrupulous reflec-
tion concerning the meanings of poverty for lawyers in the 1990s. I must
acknowledge several barriers to having this conversation with students,
in a required course.
The inquiry is discomforting. It threatens our experience of inno-
cence. In our culture, one's real thoughts on moral questions are pre-
sumed to be private, reserved to circles of one's own selection. It is
unfamiliar to regard the relation of teacher and student as mutual in such
a sense. There is little vocabulary to help us have this conversation.
There is a certain contemporary resistance to reflectiveness. The domi-
nant socialization depicts lawyers as pragmatic problem-solvers who get
things done, not poets who wallow in angst or therapists whose expertise
is empathy. 37 For faculty members, it is worrisome to press the responsi-
bility question to students in its personal form. To do so crosses a barrier
of practice and perceived propriety about the bounds of teaching.38 It is
more familiar to rephrase the question in its abstract and absolving ver-
sions. Should our state adopt a mandatory pro bono requirement? Are
there circumstances in which it is moral to disclose confidences? Can we
identify ways that property and contract doctrines reify and celebrate
conservative social views that attribute inequalities in status, bargaining
power, or wealth-accumulation to the talents and abilities of individuals?
To retreat to abstraction avoids the common response for many stu-
dents, when the conversation impinges on the moral dimensions of the
work, to feel that one's own moral weight and worth is being questioned
by the faculty member and that this is out-of-bounds. Students doubt
that such questions are fair for a teacher to ask, and may confuse a
teacher's attention to their decisionmaking process with some ultimate
37. Being practical directs focus away from the impacts of feeling, personality, life cir-
cumstances, or nonlegal moral fixtures like the resurgence of religion evidenced in the lives of
many contemporary law students. The approach depicted by Theresa Glennon attempts to
solve this problem by making explicit the reality, and pertinence, of these aspects in students'
explorations. She makes an invitation to moral discourse and to visions of law practice filled
with the potential for deep connection rather than dissociation. See Glennon, supra note 7, at
1179.
38. However, these bounds have been set by a limited notion of teaching as transferring
units of knowledge. Other bounds are needed where the teaching objectives are expanded as in
our LTP courses.
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judgment about their merit as responsible persons. Thus, it is necessary
to answer the unspoken premise that this interior conversation is per-
sonal, private, or otherwise not relevant to the students' professional
training.
At this juncture, I conclude that such an answer must be in form
and substance, an invitation.3 9 One can offer to students the view of each
lawyer bearing responsibilities to the poor, a world view from which to
see oneself as making choices that have consequences both for oneself
and for others.4° I find it is possible to meet others in such conversa-
tions, not in argument so much as in a kind of discipline of moral con-
sciousness. It is no use to insist or expect that students see the social
world and its moral universe as I do.4 1 Yet, I can ask that they take
seriously the counter-pictures of the bonds among law, poverty, and
practice that I offer. In conversations where we tell each other where we
stand, what we believe, and explore what we should do, there is the per-
haps unexpected opportunity to be reinforced-in the sense of discover-
ing that we are not in the world by ourselves. Especially when we engage
in this conversation with others who hold very different views, we may
find that there is more to account for than to assume.
39. For a breathtaking elaboration of this idea which, if heeded, should revolutionize the
legacy of Socrates in legal education, see Emily Fowler Hartigan, The Power of Language
Beyond Words: Law as Invitation, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67 (1991). She proposes that:
The invitation of law is beyond words .... It is as simple as Socrates' notion that
justice in the soul, justice in the republic and justice in the world are of one form... ;
it is as complex as the attempt to say a truth that resides in the whole of the universe
.... As Socrates said that the only real power is the power to persuade another to do
the right thing for the right reasons.... [and] that persuasion is a gentle draw, more
than a compelling force, an invitation more than a command.
Id at 75, 89.
40. It is a difficult teaching problem to create the space in which this sort of conversation
occurs. By "space" I mean more than its implication of a free or safe zone; I mean to include
both conceptual capability and the will to relax the reflexive grip on familiar obscuring prem-
ises. I have found it to be extremely hard to keep this space open where it is most needed,
namely, at precisely the point in the analytic process where arguments are fully stated and
valuing is necessary to complete the process of analysis.
41. No teacher can wholly prescribe or overcome adult students' perspectives on the
world. Neither the petty coercions of academic settings, nor even the power of rational argu-
ment, can do more than silence, temporarily, contrary beliefs about the world. See Lesnick,
supra note 28, at 442 (suggesting that when we put forward our logical and rhetorical con-
structs in dialogue, we expose these, intentionally, to some degree of risk, challenge, and
change). But these are proxies for more basic beliefs to which we are deeply attached, and
which we reserve from that arena of exposure and risk. Most of us are unable to surrender our
most cherished beliefs even in the light of a felt compulsion from reason to do so. Id. at 443.
The degree to which any student takes to heart the discipline I espouse is, by necessity, her
own doing.
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Standing where I do in students' legal careers, I am fortunate to see
some evidence of students learning that the choice is meaningfully theirs
not to close out the poor and underrepresented of their communities.
This is the initiation of an interior conversation about the deep contours
of the professional life the student contemplates, and can yet fashion, if
she will.
